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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000) (holding (1) the State
parties' failure to raise preclusion argument at a much earlier date and
the Court's 1963 decision in Arizona I did not foreclose the United
States and Fort Yuma Indian Reservation's ("Reservation") increased
water rights claims for the Reservation's disputed boundary lands, and
(2) Docket No. 320 did not preclude the United States and
Reservation from asserting water rights claims for the Reservation).
In 1952, the State of Arizona invoked the United States Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to determine the extent to which Arizona
and the State of California could use Colorado River system water.
The United States intervened, seeking water rights for, among others,
the Fort Yuma (Quechan) Indian Reservation ("Reservation").
In the 1963 initial litigation ("Arizona I"), the Court concluded
tribe's water rights were effective upon creation of reservations.
Hence, such water rights constituted present perfected rights given
priority under the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928. Additionally,
the Court decreed a tribe's water rights should be determined based
upon each reservation's amount of practicably irrigable acreage.
In 1978, the United States-joined by others, including the
Reservation-and Arizona, California, the Coachella Valley Water
District, and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(collectively, "State parties"), motioned the Court to enter a
supplemental decree to identify present perfected rights regarding
each State's mainstream water use and priority dates. The Court
declined to resolve the issue, instead declaring that the Reservation's
rights were subject to appropriate adjustment-either by an agreement
or the Court's decree if the reservation's boundaries were conclusively
determined.
In the 1983 second round of litigation ("Arizona II"), the Court
held the Secretary of the Interior's various administrative actions did
not
constitute
final
determinations
concerning
Reservation
boundaries. Also, the Court barred the United States from pursuing
water rights for lands omitted from Arizona I proceedings.
In 1984, the Court issued another supplemental decree, declaring
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that the Reservation's water rights were subject to appropriate
adjustment-either through an agreement or the Court's judgment if
the reservation's boundaries were conclusively determined.
Subsequently, the State parties motioned the Court to determine
whether the Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary
lands, and, if so, further water rights. The Court granted the State
parties' motion in 1989.
The State parties' motion arose from President Arthur's 1884
Executive Order, which designated approximately seventy-two square
miles of land in California along the Colorado River to the
The Reservation reached an agreement ("1893
Reservation.
Congress, whereby the Reservation ceded a 25,000with
Agreement")
acre tract of its boundary lands in exchange for irrigated land
allotments to individual Indians. The 1893 Agreement was contingent
upon the United States performing certain specified obligations.
In 1935, doubts about the 1893 Agreement's validity emerged due
to the Bureau of Reclamation's ("Bureau") attempt to route the AllAmerican Canal through the Reservation's land. Arguably, the Bureau
had to compensate the Reservation for such action. In 1936, Solicitor
Margold rendered an opinion ("Margold Opinion") declaring that the
Reservation had unconditionally ceded the disputed lands to the
United States via the 1893 Agreement.
In 1951, the Reservation initiated an action ("Docket No. 320")
before the Indian Claims Commission ("Commission"), challenging
the 1893 agreement's validity. The Commission stayed the trial
proceedings due to proposed congressional legislation that would have
given the disputed lands back to the Reservation. Because Congress
never enacted such legislation, the Commission vacated the stay. In
1976, the Commission transferred the matter to the Court of Claims.
Meanwhile, the Reservation had requested the Department of the
Interior to reconsider its Margold Opinion. In 1978, Solicitor Krulitz
("Krulitz Opinion") concluded: (1) the 1893 Agreement had provided
for a conditional cessation of the disputed lands; (2) the United States
had not met such conditions; and (3) the United States held the
disputed property's title in trust for the Reservation. On December 20,
1978, the Secretary of the Interior elicited a Secretarial Order that
adopted the Krulitz Opinion.
In August 1983, the United States and the Reservation accepted a
settlement, whereby the United States agreed to pay the Reservation
fifteen million dollars to fully satisfy all rights, claims, or demands the
Reservation had or could have asserted pursuant to Docket 320 claims.
The Court of Claims approved such settlement and entered its final
judgment accordingly. Furthermore, the Court of Claims concluded
the Reservation was barred from asserting any further rights, claims, or
demands against the United States and any future action pertaining to
Docket 320 claims.
The Reservation and the United States claimed in the present
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action that the Reservation should have increased water rights in the
Colorado River. The Reservation and the United States based their
claim upon the contention that the Reservation encompassed 25,000
acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to the Reservation in
earlier stages of this lengthy litigation.
First, the United States Supreme Court considered whether
Arizona I precluded the United States and Reservation's claims. The
State parties contended the United States could have raised the
Reservation's boundary lands claim in the Arizona I proceedings and
did not do so. Due to the Court's finality rationale in dismissing
"omitted lands" claims in Arizona II, the State parties argued the
United States was precluded from asserting its boundary lands claim.
Also, they maintained that even if they failed to raise their preclusion
defense earlier, the Court should raise it now sua sponte.
The United States and the Reservation responded that Arizona II's
"omitted lands" rationale was not equally applicable to their disputed
boundary lands claim. Furthermore, they argued the State parties had
forfeited their preclusion defense.
The Court found the State parties' preclusion defense
inadmissible, and, therefore, did not decide the "omitted lands" issue
on the merits. The Court concluded Arizona II contained no
discussion or inferences that the boundary lands issue might be
precluded. Additionally, the Court noted the State parties neither
raised their preclusion defense in 1979 in response to the United
States' supplemental decree motion awarding the Reservation
additional water rights, nor raised their preclusion defense when
Arizona II was briefed and argued in 1982. Because the State parties
had several opportunities to raise their preclusion argument and did
not do so, a reasonable time frame to raise such argument had
expired. Lastly, the Court declared it had never previously decided
the boundary lands issue, thus declining to address a preclusion bar
sua sponte. The Court held the State parties' failure to raise their
preclusion argument earlier did not prevent the United States and the
Reservation from claiming the Reservation was entitled to increased
water rights for the disputed boundary lands.
Second, the Court considered whether the United States and
Reservation's claims were precluded by the United States Claims
Court's 1983judgment proceeding, Docket No. 320. The State parties
argued that such was the case based upon section 22 of the Indian
Claims Commission Act ("Act"). According to the State parties, the
Commission's judgment regarding claims to aboriginal or trust lands
ceased land title and barred future claims against either the United
States or third parties based on the extinguished title. The Court held
that Docket No. 320 did not qualify as a judgment; hence, these State
parties' arguments were inapplicable.
The Court also considered the issue preclusion doctrine. The
Court acknowledged that Docket No. 320 expressly appeared to have a
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claim-preclusive effect. However, the Court averred that settlements,
generally, did not generate issue preclusion, unless the parties clearly
intended their agreement to have such effect. The Court further
stated that an issue preclusion argument was justified only when both a
legal or factual issue was actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and such determination was essential to the
judgment. Accordingly, the Court held the Docket No. 320 judgment
did not preclude the United States and Reservation's claims for
increased water rights regarding the Reservation's disputed boundary
lands.
Finally, the Court approved the parties' proposed settlement
concerning the Colorado River Indian Reservation.
The Court remanded the United States and Reservation's water
rights claims, associated with the Reservation's disputed boundary
lands claims, to the Special Master for determination on the merits.
The Court declared that such claims were the last it would decide
regarding the lengthy Arizona v. California litigation. The Court
concluded that resolution of such claims allowed it to enter a final
consolidated decree, thus concluding this litigation.
SaraFranklin

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
S. Road Assocs. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 216 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding citizen suits under the Resource Conservation Recovery Act
("RCRA") alleging groundwater contamination must be brought
against persons or entities currently engaged in the specific RCRA
violations).
International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM") leased and
occupied property ("Site") from South Road Associates ("SRA")
starting in the mid-1950s for manufacturing, parts-cleaning, storage,
SRA acquired the
shipping, and other commercial operations.
property around 1979 and continued leasing the property to IBM until
the 1994 expiration of the lease. During this time IBM used and
stored chemicals on the Site classified by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA") as solid and hazardous wastes. In 1981,
IBM became aware of potential environmental problems at the Site.
Through an internal investigation, IBM discovered that chemicals
stored in underground tanks leaked and contaminated the
surrounding soil, bedrock, and groundwater. In 1987, the New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation ("NYSDEC")

